The recent rapid growth of the Internet as a medium of communication and commerce, combined with the development of sophisticated software tools, are to a large extent responsible for producing a new kind of information: databases with detailed records about consumers' preferences. These databases have become part of a Þrm's assets, and as such they can be sold to competitors. This possibility has raised numerous concerns from consumer privacy advocates and regulators, who have entered into a heated debate with business groups and industry associations about whether the practice of customer information sharing should be banned, regulated, or left unchecked. This paper investigates the incentives of rival Þrms to share their customer-speciÞc information and evaluates the welfare implications if such exchanges are banned, in the context of a perfect price discrimination model. JEL ClassiÞcation Codes: D43, L13, O30.
Introduction
Earlier literature on information sharing among rival Þrms has mainly focused on two types of information exchanges: i) Þrms share -directly or indirectly -their private signals about demand conditions [e.g. Gal-Or (1985) , Vives (1990) and Villas-Boas (1994)], or ii) Þrms exchange cost data [e.g. Shapiro (1986) and Armantier and Richard (2001) ]. The recent rapid growth of the Internet as a medium of communication and commerce, combined with the development of sophisticated software tools, are to a large extent responsible for producing a new kind of information: databases with detailed records about consumers' preferences. Such data are gleaned from a customer's transactions with a Þrm and public records and are used to assemble a detailed picture of consumers. 1 Firms can utilize this information to improve the focus of their marketing campaigns, to design products that better Þt the needs of their customers and to tailor their price offers according to each consumers' brand preferences. These databases have become part of a Þrm's assets, and as such they can be sold to competitors. This possibility has raised numerous concerns from consumer privacy advocates and regulators, who have entered into a heated debate with business groups and industry associations about whether the practice of customer information sharing should be banned, regulated, or left unchecked. 2 Nevertheless, there is very little theoretical work done on this issue. This paper is a step in this direction. We look at rival Þrms' incentives to share their customerspeciÞc information and we evaluate the welfare implications if such exchanges are banned, in the context of a perfect price discrimination model.
We formulate a dynamic (two-period) location model of horizontal and vertical differentiation with two rival Þrms. In the Þrst period Þrms know only the distribution of brand preferences and each charges a uniform price. At the beginning of the second period each Þrm collects detailed (perfect) information about its own customers (i.e., the ones who purchased its product in period 1). Then, each Þrm decides whether to sell its customer database to the rival Þrm. The customer information enables a Þrm, in the next stage, to price discriminate among consumers with different degrees of brand loyalty.
1 "Few consumers could write down even 1% of the amount of data that companies have about them," Customer Data Means Money, www.informationweek.com, August 20, 2001 . 2 For example see, "Senator takes aim at e-commerce data-sharing effort," www.computerworld.com, December 7, 2000 . Based on the Online Privacy Protection Act consumers should give their consent to Þrms before they share customer information with a third party, e.g. "A very public battle over privacy," Business Week, May 23, 2002. However, Þrms make every effort to safeguard valuable consumer information and their option to sell it to third parties. According to the latter article above, "...most companies burry the opt-out notices within masses of legal jargon at the bottom of monthly mailings. " We show that a necessary condition for some type of information sharing to be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium is Þrm asymmetry. More speciÞcally, when Þrms have equal customer bases (i.e., pure horizontal differentiation), then in equilibrium, neither Þrm Þnds it proÞtable to sell its database to the rival Þrm. With enough Þrm asymmetry, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the Þrm with the lower customer base (i.e., the low quality Þrm) sells its information to the Þrm with the higher customer base (i.e., the high quality Þrm). The high quality Þrm never sells, in equilibrium, its information to the low quality Þrm, regardless of the difference in the customer bases between the two Þrms. If sharing of customer information is banned, then social welfare may decrease or increase depending upon the degree of Þrm asymmetry and how heavily the future is discounted. In addition, Þrms always become worse off, while consumers always become better off, when sharing is banned.
Chen, Narasimhan and Zhang (2001) is a paper most closely related to our work. The authors investigate the incentives of rival Þrms to sell customer information of imperfect targetability (accuracy). The main differences between our model and theirs are: i) in their model there are three types of consumers (loyal to a Þrm and switchers), while in ours there is a continuum of consumers, ii) our information identiÞes the preferences of each consumer with perfect accuracy, while in their model information may also be imperfect and iii) their model is static, whereas ours is dynamic.
They show that information sharing will take place provided that the size of the two Þrms' loyal customers is not too different and moreover the seller of information is the Þrm with the low level of targetability. This is in contrast with our conclusion, where information sharing occurs if and only if the two Þrms' customer bases are sufficiently different. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) use a similar to ours two-period location model with symmetric Þrms, where in the second period Þrms can segment the consumers into two groups (own customers and rival Þrm's customers) depending upon a consumer's purchasing decision in period 1. Firms do not collect any further information about their own customers and consequently the issue of information sharing does not arise. The authors focus on the use of short-term and long-term contracts as part of a Þrm's equilibrium strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model. The two-period game is analyzed in section 3, where we search for a subgame perfect equilibrium which entails some type of customer information sharing. In section 4, we solve the game assuming that information sharing is banned and we assess the welfare implications of such a policy. We conclude in section 5. The appendix contains the proofs of propositions 2, 3 and 4.
The description of the model
There are two Þrms A and B who produce competing nondurable goods A and B respectively with constant per-unit marginal cost of c and are located at the two end points of the unit interval [0, 1].
There are two periods, t = 1, 2, and a common discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1]. The market is comprised of a continuum of consumers uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Each consumer buys one unit of either good A or B or neither in each period. A consumer located at point x derives utility, in period t, V A − ζx if he buys from Þrm A and utility V B − ζ(1 − x) if he buys from Þrm B, and a zero utility if he buys from neither Þrm, where ζ > 0 is the per-unit of distance transportation cost. 3 We assume that V A ≥ V B , allowing the Þrms to be asymmetric. Hence, consumers x's relative preferences over the two goods is given by,`= (V A − V B ) + ζ(1 − 2x). There is a oneto-one correspondence between x and`and therefore from now on the representative consumer is identiÞed by`. We call`consumer`'s degree of loyalty, which is uniformly distributed on the interval I = [−`B,`A], with`A = (V A − V B ) + ζ,`B = − (V A − V B ) + ζ and density 1. Clearly, A ≥`B and`A > 0. Consumers with positive loyalty prefer brand A, while consumers with negative loyalty prefer brand B, all else equal. We further assume that`B ≥ 0. If`A =`B, the model is analogous to the standard model of horizontal differentiation. If`B = 0, it becomes the standard model of vertical differentiation. If`A >`B > 0, the setup has elements of both horizontal and vertical differentiation. Let p t A (`) and p t B (`) denote the price offers to consumer`, from Þrm A and B respectively, in period t. We denote by π t A and π t B Þrm A's and B's proÞts respectively in period t. By Π A and Π B we denote the sum of discounted proÞts over the two periods. The Þrms act to maximize Π A and Π B . Consumer`maximizes her discounted sum of period utilities, using the same discount factor δ as the Þrms. 4 At the beginning of period 1 Þrms know only the distribution of consumer preferences. At the end of period 1 each Þrm collects detailed (perfect) information only about its own consumers' brand preferences (i.e., the ones who purchased its product). A Þrms can sell its information directly to the rival Þrm, or indirectly by Þrst selling it to a market-research company, knowing that the latter will sell it to the rival. 5 This distinction does not make a difference, in our model, and we will assume that selling is direct. Also, we assume that Þrms follow a simple strategy in regards to the information sharing: a Þrm sells its entire customer database as it is. In other words, we do not search for an optimal selling mechanism. For example, we have excluded strategies on part of the information seller such as: selling only part of the information, or even damaging the information by "throwing in" some noise. This issue is certainly very interesting, but it goes beyond the scope of the present paper. Furthermore, to simplify the analysis, we have assumed that a Þrm has no information about the brand preferences of the rival Þrm's own customers prior to information sharing (besides, of course, knowing that these customers are not its own). In practice,
Þrms may possess such data, albeit this information is most likely to be more noisy than the rival's corresponding information. Therefore, our implicit assumption in this paper is that this noise is sufficiently high, so that a Þrm cannot segment the consumers of its rival (before information sharing takes place).
There are two types of customer information sharing that will be considered in this paper,
• Two-way information sharing, where Þrms exchange their customer databases (the net price may be strictly positive).
• One-way information sharing, where only one Þrm sells its customer information to its rival. The game we will analyze unfolds as follows:
Period 1
• In stage 1, Þrms, simultaneously and independently, choose their uniform prices.
• In stage 2, consumers decide from which Þrm to buy.
Period 2
• In stage 1, each Þrm decides whether to sell its customer information to its rival Þrm.
• In stage 2, Þrms, simultaneously and independently, choose their blanket coupons.
• In stage 3, Þrms, simultaneously and independently, choose their targeted coupons.
• In stage 4, consumers decide from which Þrm to buy.
We assume that targeted promotions, in period 2, are chosen after Þrms have decided about the value of their blanket coupons. This set up parallels the multistage games that have been examined in the literature [e.g. Banks and Moorthy (1999) , Rao (1991) , Zhang (1995 & 2002) and Thisse and Vives] where Þrms choose their promotional strategies (targeted coupons) after they have chosen their regular (uniform) prices. This assumption serves two purposes. First it is consistent with the common view that a Þrm's regular price can be adjusted slower than the choice of targeted coupons and second if both decisions are made simultaneously no pure strategy equilibrium exists. Although, blanket coupons in period 2 are not exactly the same as a uniform price, blanket coupons have an element of stickiness, relative to targeted coupons, similar to that of a regular price. Moreover, a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist when Þrms choose blanket and targeted coupons simultaneously (for the same reason that it does not exist when Þrms choose regular prices and targeted coupons simultaneously). 6 Hence, we model these two strategic choices in period 2 sequentially. Furthermore, there is no need to include a regular price in period 2. 7 Remark 1. We completely ignore other possible utilizations of consumer information by the Þrms and we focus entirely on its use as a facilitator of price discrimination. Furthermore, we overlook possible non-economic effects (e.g. pure privacy issues) that information sharing may have on consumers. Also, we assume away the likelihood that a Þrm's customer database can also be shared with a non-rival Þrm, which is very likely to beneÞt both parties. Moreover, there is no demand creation in our model, another positive aspect of having detailed information. Our purpose in this paper is to identify equilibrium strategies regarding sharing of customer information in the most competitive environment, where only the business stealing effect is present.
Remark 2. We assume that the information enables the Þrms to learn the location of each consumer with perfect accuracy (perfect information). In reality, Þrms can identify each consumer's brand loyalty with some noise, which depends on the quantity and quality of the available information. In Liu and Serfes (2003), we solve a symmetric (pure horizontal differentiation) price discrimination model with imperfect information about consumer brand preferences. The imprecision with which each consumer's loyalty is identiÞed depends on the quality of the available information.
As the quality increases the noise is reduced. The limit of this process is the perfect information paradigm. Although this modeling approach seems more realistic, it renders the model intractable when it is coupled with Þrm asymmetry (a very crucial assumption in the present model). Hence, one can view the results in the present paper as the solution to an interesting limiting case.
In the next section, we search for a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). In particular, we are interested in a SPE in pure strategies where some type of information sharing takes place.
Analysis
In this section, we proceed as follows. After the Þrst period ends, there are four subgames following the Þrms' decisions about whether to share information or not: i) no information exchange (NE), ii) 6 Proof is available upon request. 7 See the discussion in Liu and Serfes as to why a regular price does not play a sheltering role in the absence of targeting costs (an assumption that we maintain in this paper).
one-way sharing, where only Þrm A sells its information to B (A → B), iii) one-way sharing, where only Þrm B sells to A (B → A) and iv) two-way sharing (A ←→ B). We analyze each subgame by Þnding the equilibrium prices and proÞts. We assume that an information selling transaction will occur if and only if there are gains from trade (GF T ), i.e., joint Þrm proÞts strictly increase over the proÞts prior to that transaction. 8 Furthermore, Þrm A's and B's bargaining powers over the surplus from the information sharing are (1 − σ) > 0 and σ > 0 respectively. Then, we move up to period 1, where Þrms choose their uniform prices to maximize the discounted sum of proÞts over the two periods. Consumers also act strategically in period 1. In particular, they maximize the discounted sum of their utility over the two periods by correctly anticipating the Þrms' information sharing decisions and the period 2 equilibrium prices. 9 
Period 2: Information sharing and pricing decisions
Let` * denote the marginal consumer in period 1. We assume that if a consumer is indifferent between the two brands, then she buys the product that she prefers if the prices were the same. • Subgame 1: No exchange of information (NE).
Each Þrm Þrst sends blanket coupons to the customers of the rival Þrm and then distributes targeted price promotions to its own customers. 10 Lets' Þrst examine the interval I 1 . Since the cutoff point is in Þrm A's territory, Þrm B will send the same price offer p 2 B = c to all consumers. 8 In this paper, we have assumed that consumers do not care about how information about them is used and whether it is shared or not. The other extreme is to assume that consumers must give their consent before Þrms share (or sell) their information. Then, consumers (or a party representing them) essentially enter, along with Þrms, into the bargaining process over the distribution of surplus from sharing information. This scenario is also likely given recent regulatory efforts to impose an "opt-in" standard, by which Þrms must obtain permission before a consumer's information is shared with third parties (see, Report for Congress, "Internet Privacy: Overview and Pending Legislation," Feb. 6, 2003, www.epic.org). We reserve this interesting topic for future research. 9 This modeling assumption is also made in Fudenberg and Tirole. 10 A Þrm is allowed to send blanket coupons to its own customers as well, but this possibility is ignored due to the ßexibility of charging individualized prices in the next stage. In addition, blanket coupons -like a regular priceserve no sheltering role in the absence of targeting costs. This holds true for all the subgames we analyze. Firm A's best response is to offer p 2 A (`) =`+ c. Each consumer is indifferent between the two Þrms and therefore buys from Þrm A. The proÞts are,
Therefore, the joint proÞts in the interval I 1 are,
Now we examine the Þrms' strategies and proÞts in the interval I 2 . Firm A sends blanket coupons, p 2 A , to the consumers in this interval, while Þrm B responds by sending targeted price offers. Given p 2 A , Þrm B's best response is to set p 2 B (`) = p 2 A −`≥ c. Clearly the marginal consumer is located in (0,` * ) and is given byˆ= p 2 A − c. Since Þrm B knows the location of each consumer perfectly it charges a price equal to marginal cost to the marginal consumer. Firm A chooses p 2 A to maximize,
The Þrst order necessary and sufficient condition is,
Hence,ˆ= p * A − c =` * /2. Therefore, Þrm A's proÞt in the interval I 2 is,
Firm B's proÞt in I 2 is,
The joint proÞts in the interval I 2 are,
The joint proÞts in [−`B,`A] are,
• Subgame 2: Firm A sells its information to Þrm B (A → B).
In the interval I 1 Þrm B sets p 2 B = c and Þrm A charges p 2 A (`) = c +`. The proÞts of each Þrm in this interval are,
and π 2 B = 0, (in segment I 1 ).
The joint proÞts in this interval are,
In the interval I 2 , joint proÞts are the same as in (6) since Þrm A has no information about Þrm B's customers. Hence the joint proÞts in [−`B,`A] are,
Note that π NE = π A→B [i.e., (7)=(9)] and therefore no gains from trading information exist when Þrm A sells its information to Þrm B.
• Subgame 3: Firm B sells its information to Þrm A (B → A). 
and
Hence, the joint proÞts are,
Firm B will sell its information to Þrm A if and only if π B→A > π NE . In other words, if and only if,`2
• Subgame 4: Firms exchange their information (A ←→ B).
The joint proÞts are the same as in subgame 3. Joint proÞts remain unchanged when Þrm A sells its information to Þrm B (see subgame 2). Hence, no such transaction will take place.
Next, assume that` * < 0. It can be easily seen that Þrm A has no incentive to acquire Þrm B's information, for the same reason that Þrm B has no incentive to acquire Þrm A's information wheǹ * ≥ 0 (see subgame 2). The gains from trade when Þrm B acquires Þrm A's information are, 11
Since` * cannot be less than −`B, gains from trading information are negative when` * < 0.
The next proposition summarizes the results regarding information exchanges. The intuition behind the above result goes as follows. When` * > 0 some of Þrm A's loyal customers purchase in period 1 from Þrm B. Consequently, Þrm A does not have these consumers in its database. This forces Þrm A to treat these consumers the same as the consumers who are loyal to Þrm B. Now suppose that Þrm A obtains information from Þrm B. This gives Þrm A the ßexibility to charge customized prices to all consumers which creates two opposing effects that govern market interaction: Þrst, competition intensiÞes since Þrm A follows a more aggressive 11 The derivations are similar to the ones when` * ≥ 0 and are omitted.
pricing strategy in Þrm B's territory (negative effect) and second, proÞts for Þrm A from its more loyal customers increase due to the surplus extraction effect (positive effect). Next, we look at these two opposing effects more closely in each one of the four distinct market segments (see also Þgure 1). We compare the difference in joint proÞts between sharing and no sharing of information. When the interval [` * /2,` * ] is sufficiently greater than [−`B, 0], the positive effect dominates the negative. Practically, this means that Þrm A's customer base is sufficiently greater than Þrm B's and moreover when Þrm A is forced to charge a uniform price, in period 1, it does not Þnd it proÞtable to serve all of its loyal customers. Rather, it charges a relatively high price to extract more rents from its relatively more loyal customers. As a result, some of the customers who, all else equal, prefer Þrm A's product to Þrm B's, end up buying from B in the Þrst period. 12 But once Þrms have the ßexibility of charging discriminatory prices, Þrm A Þnds it proÞtable to reclaim these consumers. If the size of this franchise is relatively big, then the gain in proÞts that Þrm A experiences outweighs Þrm B's losses. This Þnding echoes the result in Shaffer and Zhang (2002) , who show that the Þrm with the larger loyal following may become better off when Þrms move from uniform to discriminatory pricing, i.e., the game need not be a prisoners' dilemma. The idea in that paper is that the market share effect -which beneÞts the Þrm with the larger customer base -may dominate the intensiÞed competition effect. This market share effect clearly plays a critical role in our framework as well. Moreover, we take it a step further by comparing the gains of the larger Þrm with the losses of its smaller rival.
It remains to be shown that the Þrst period uniform pricing strategy that we described in the above paragraph is indeed part of a SPE. This is what we do next.
Period 1: Uniform pricing
In this section, we mainly search for a SPE where sharing of information takes place. As we proved in the previous subsection, the only possibility is for Þrm B to sell its information to Þrm A. Thus, in period 2 the game play is in subgame 3. Consumers have rational expectations. They know how their purchasing decisions in period 1 will affect the information each Þrm has about them and consequently the price offers they will receive from each Þrm in period 2. The marginal consumer` * (with` * > 0, since otherwise sharing of information is not proÞtable) in period 1 must be indifferent between buying from Þrm A today at price p 1 A (and entering Þrm A's database) and then buying again in period 2 from Þrm A at price` * + c, or buying from Þrm B in period 1 (and entering Þrm B's database) at price p 1 B and then buying from A in period 2 at price` * + c. Thus the indifferent consumer must satisfy,
Each consumer located to the right of` * purchases Þrm A's product in both periods. Consumers located in [0,` * ) purchase from Þrm B in period 1 and then switch to Þrm A in period 2 (since Þrm B sells information about these customers to Þrm A and since they are loyal to Þrm A, Þrm B cannot get them). Finally, consumers in [−`B, 0) buy from Þrm B in both periods.
The information price (IP) Þrm A pays to Þrm B for acquiring Þrm B's database is, 
Firms in period 1 choose their uniform prices to maximize (13) and (14). The Þrst period price is chosen by a Þrm to strike an optimal balance in the trade-off between: i) losing (gaining) marginal consumers in period 1 and having a smaller (larger) customer database in period 2 and ii) gaining (losing) inframarginal rents in period 1. A SPE where Þrm B sells its information to Þrm A is summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 2 (SPE with information sharing). When`A > 13`B the unique SPE can be described as follows:
• Period 1: The Þrms' uniform prices are,
The marginal consumer is located at,` *
• Period 2: Firm B sells its customer database to Þrm A at price,
The prices that each Þrm charges to each consumer are the same as in subgame 3.
• Both periods: The sum of discounted equilibrium proÞts are, 
Proposition 3 (SPE when information sharing is banned).
When`A > 13`B and information sharing is banned, the unique SPE can be described as follows:
• Period 1: The Þrms' uniform prices are, 
The marginal consumer is located at
• Period 2: The prices that each Þrm charges to each consumer are the same as in subgame 1, where no exchange of information takes place.
Proof. See appendix. ¥ The market share of Þrm A in period 1 is larger when information sharing is banned than when it is not [i.e.,` * ≥` * * , provided that`A ≥ 7`B, a condition that is satisÞed given our assumptions].
When information sharing is banned, Þrm A lowers its price in an attempt to gain a larger share and consequently to increase the number of consumers in its database, given that in period 2 the possibility of buying these names from its rival Þrm is non-existent. In response, Þrm B lowers its price as well, but not as aggressively as Þrm A.
Social welfare. With unit demands and a covered market, only the disutility from not buying the most preferred brand matters. The possibility of sharing customer databases with the rival
Þrm distributes the dead-weight loss differently across the two periods than when this possibility is absent. In the former case, Þrms price less aggressively in the Þrst period, which allows the lower quality Þrm to capture some of its rival's customers, resulting in an inefficient outcome. In the second period, though, this inefficiency disappears, since each consumer buys her most preferred brand. In the latter case, the higher quality Þrm Þghts more for market share, surrendering fewer consumers to the rival, which reduces the Þrst period inefficiency. On the other hand, the second period inefficiency does not vanish (see Þgures 2 and 3). These opposing effects create an interesting trade-off for a regulatory authority who wishes to regulate customer information sharing. This trade-off we have identiÞed is likely to be present in a context more general than ours. Next, we compute the social welfare over the two periods.
In period 1, the social welfare when information sharing is banned is greater than that when sharing is allowed by,
In this case, the extra inefficiency when information sharing is allowed arises because the group of consumers in the interval [` * * ,` * ] do not buy their most preferred brand, whereas when information sharing is banned they do (see Þgure 2). In period 2, the social welfare when information sharing is allowed is greater than that when sharing is banned by,
When information sharing is allowed, the second period outcome is efficient. Hence, the inefÞciency when sharing is banned comes from the group of consumers in the interval [0,` * * /2] who buy from Þrm B, while their favored Þrm is A (see Þgure 3). Therefore, the discounted social welfare change when information sharing in banned is,
If (21) is positive, then the outcome when information sharing is banned is more efficient than when it is not. The next proposition presents the social welfare comparison.
Proposition 4 (Social welfare comparison). If 13`B <`A < 
, then the social welfare when information sharing is banned decreases for any δ <δ < 1, while for any
Proof. See appendix. ¥ When the two Þrms do not have very different in size customer bases, banning information sharing lowers social welfare. When the customer base of one Þrm is signiÞcantly larger than that of the rival Þrm, banning information lowers social welfare only for relatively low discount factors.
On the other hand, for relatively high discount factors, welfare increases.
Profits. Both Þrms become worse off when information sharing is banned [i.e., (16) > (19) and (17) > 20]. 13 Consumer welfare. The change in consumer welfare is simply the difference between the change in social welfare and the change in proÞts. We have shown that consumer welfare always decreases when information sharing is allowed. 14
Concluding remarks
We develop a parsimonious two-period model with two rival Þrms who produce horizontally and vertically differentiated products. Our main purpose in this paper is to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions under which Þrms will share, in some way, their customer-speciÞc information.
The information is about the consumers' location (brand preferences) and enables the Þrms who possess it to engage in perfect price discrimination. In the Þrst period, Þrms know only the distribution of preferences and consequently charge uniform prices. At the beginning of the second period they collect perfect information about their own customers (i.e., the ones who purchased their product in period 1) and decide whether to sell this information to the rival Þrm. We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for information sharing to be part of the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is sufficient Þrm asymmetry. In this case, the low quality Þrm Þnds it in its best interest to sell its customer database to the high quality Þrm. On the other hand, the high quality Þrm never sells its information to its low quality rival. If information sharing is banned, the social welfare decreases when the degree of Þrm asymmetry is below a certain threshold. When this threshold is exceeded social welfare decreases only when the discount factor is below a threshold, while it increases when the discount factor is above that threshold. Finally, when sharing is banned, proÞts decrease, while consumers surplus increases. 13 The proof is very straightforward and it is omitted. It is available upon request. 14 The proof is very straightforward and it is omitted. It is available upon request.
Appendix: Proofs of propositions
Proof of proposition 2. The proof consists of three parts: 1) Þrst, we solve the system of reaction functions, 2) then, we check all possible deviations and Þnally 3) we prove uniqueness of SPE.
1) Firm A's and B's Þrst order conditions (foc) are,
Note that the second order condition is satisÞed. By solving (A1) and (A2) with respect to p 1 A and p 1 B , we obtain the Þrst period equilibrium (uniform) prices,
By plugging (A3) and (A4) back into the objective functions, we obtain the sum of discounted equilibrium proÞts, Based on the Þrst period equilibrium prices, the marginal consumer is located at * = p
By plugging (A7) into IP = σ` * (` * −4`B ) 8
we obtain the equilibrium information price, which is,
Recall from proposition 1, that for information sharing to be part of a SPE (where Þrm B sells its information to A) it must be the case that` * > 4`B. Using (A7), it follows that` * > 4`B if and only if`A > 13`B.
2) To conclude that the above pair of prices constitutes a SPE, we must demonstrate that unilateral deviations are unproÞtable. There are two types of deviations in our model: i) a Þrm changes its Þrst period price but Þrm B still Þnds it proÞtable in period 2 to sell its information to Þrm A (i.e., the assumed structure remains unchanged) and ii) a price change leads to a no sharing of information in period 2 (i.e., the assumed structure changes). The Þrst type of deviation has already been proved that it is not proÞtable, since the price pair is a solution to the system of best response functions.
Next we show that the second type of deviation is not proÞtable either. We Þrst look at Þrm A's incentives to deviate and then at Þrm B's.
• Firm A's deviation in period 1.
For the structure to change it must be the case that Þrm A lowers its price to the point that * < 4`B and therefore information sharing in period 2 is not proÞtable. There are two distinct interior cases: i) 4`B >` * > 0 and ii)` * < 0 and two distinct boundary cases: i)` * = 0 and ii) * = −`B. An interior deviation can be ruled out for one of the following two reasons: either it leads to lower proÞts than the ones before deviation, or it produces a contradiction in terms of` * .
If the contradiction is in terms of` * (e.g.,` * > 4`B), then we have to check the boundary cases.
We start with the Þrst interior case.
This deviation on part of Þrm A leads the game play to subgame 1 in period 2. The marginal consumer` * in period 1 must be indifferent between buying from Þrm A today at price p 1 A (in which case she is in Þrm A's database) and then buying again in period 2 from Þrm A at pricè * + c, or buying from Þrm B in period 1 at price p 1 B (in which case she is in Þrm B's database) and then buying from A in period 2 from Þrm A at price` * /2 + c. Thus the indifferent consumer must satisfy,
Firm A's sum of discounted deviation proÞts are,
where the second period proÞts come from subgame 1 and in particular (1) and (4),` * is given by (A8) and p 1 B is Þxed at the level given by (A4). The deviating Þrm chooses p 1 A to maximize (A9). We show that as long as`A > 13`B such deviation is not proÞtable. In particular, the maximized proÞts as given by (A5) are greater than the maximum deviation proÞts max p 1
To keep the paper within acceptable limits, in the remaining of this proof, we do not present the calculations regarding the comparison of Þrm proÞts before and after a deviation. These calculations are straightforward and are available upon request.
We continue with the second interior deviation, i.e.,` * < 0. No information sharing takes place in period 2. This case leads to a subgame similar to subgame 1. Following the same steps as in that subgame, we can show that Þrm B, in period 2, charges a price of c −` * /2 to the consumers in segment (` * ,`A] and an individualized price c −`to the consumers in [−`B,` * ]. Firm A's proÞts in period 2 are analogous to those given by Eq.(5), i.e.,
The marginal consumer` * in period 1 must be indifferent between buying from Þrm A today at price p 1 A and then buying in period 2 from Þrm B at price c −` * /2, or buying from Þrm B in period 1 at price p 1 B and then buying again from B in period 2 at price c −` * . The indifferent consumer must satisfy,
Using (A10) and (A11), Þrm A's sum of discounted deviation proÞts are,
We differentiate (A12) with respect to p 1 A and we solve the (foc). The function is strictly concave. The resulting` * , however, is positive which leads to a contradiction.
Next, we look at the boundary deviations. When` * = 0, from (A8), p 1 A must be equal to p 1 B , where the latter is Þxed at the level given by (A4). We plug the p 1 A which solves` * = 0, into (A9) and we show that it is lower than (A5). Then we look at` * = −`B. We use (A11) and (A12) to Þnd Þrm A's proÞts. Again we show that they are lower than the ones given by (A5).
• Firm B's deviation in period 1.
For the structure to change it must be the case that Þrm B increases its price to the point that * < 4`B and therefore information sharing in period 2 is not proÞtable. Similarly to the deviation of Þrm A, there are two interior deviations and two boundary. We begin with 4`B >` * > 0. The marginal consumer is the same as in (A8). The Þrst period price of Þrm A is Þxed at its level given by (A3). The sum of discounted deviation proÞts are calculated in a similar manner as those of Þrm A in the same type of deviation, using also the equilibrium proÞts from subgame 1. We obtain a contradiction, i.e., the resulting` * is greater than 4`B.
Then we turn to` * < 0. The marginal consumer is the same as in (A11). The Þrst period price of Þrm A is Þxed at its level given by (A3). The sum of discounted deviation proÞts are calculated in a similar manner as those of Þrm A in the same type of deviation. We Þnd that` * > 0 as long as`A > 13`B, which leads to a contradiction.
The two boundary deviations are computed in the same manner as those for Þrm A. ProÞts are lower than the ones given by (A6).
3) So far, we have proved that when`A > 13`B, the strategies that are described in the statement of proposition 2 constitute a SPE. Now we will show that this SPE is unique. Given that information will be shared in period 2, the pricing strategies, as we have demonstrated above, are indeed unique. But is information sharing the only outcome when`A > 13`B? To be more precise, we will prove that no sharing of information is not a SPE under the assumptions of proposition 2.
Let`A > 13`B, but nevertheless no sharing of information takes place in period 2. For this to be the case, it must be that` * ≤ 4`B (otherwise Þrm B will sell its information to A). There are two cases: i) 4`B >` * ≥ 0 and ii)` * ≤ 0. In the Þrst case the marginal consumer is the same as in (A8), while in the second she is the same as in (A11). When` * ≥ 0, the proÞt functions are (using the results from subgame 1), The above proÞt functions are strictly concave in p 1 A and p 1 B respectively. We derive the two reaction functions and we Þnd the unique intersection point. When`A > 14`B, the` * we Þnd using the solution to the system of the reaction functions is greater than 4`B, which is inconsistent with the no information sharing presumption. When 13`B <`A ≤ 14`B, Þrm A has an incentive to deviate by increasing its price, thereby lowering its Þrst period market share to the point where information sharing is proÞtable in period 2, a contradiction to the no information sharing assumption. The above proÞt functions are strictly concave in p 1 A and p 1 B respectively. We derive the two reaction functions and we Þnd the unique intersection point. The` * we Þnd, using the solution to the system of the reaction functions is strictly positive, a contradiction. ¥ Proof of proposition 3. We begin our search for a SPE, assuming that` * * ≥ 0. Differentiate The Þrst period marginal consumer, based on the above prices, is located at, * * = 2 [`A (2 − δ) − 2`B (1 − δ)] 12 − 5δ .
To conclude that the above pair of prices constitutes a SPE, we must demonstrate that unilateral deviations are unproÞtable. There are two types of deviations in our model: i) a Þrm changes its Þrst period price, but still` * * ≥ 0 and ii) a price change leads to` * * < 0. The Þrst type of deviation has already been proved that it is not proÞtable, since the price pair is a solution to the system of best response functions.
Next we show that the second type of deviation is not proÞtable either. We Þrst look at Þrm A's incentives to deviate and then at Þrm B's. 15
15 As in the proof of proposition 2, the details pertaining to the comparison of proÞts before and after a deviation are straightforward and therefore are omitted. They are, however, available upon request. Firm B's price is Þxed at the level given by (A18). Firm A's proÞt function is the same as the one given by (A15), since now` * * < 0. We show that this type of deviation is not proÞtable.
• Firm B's deviation in period 2. Firm A's price is Þxed at the level given by (A17). Firm B's proÞt function is the same as the one given by (A16), again since` * * < 0. We show that this deviation is not proÞtable either.
Next, we search for an equilibrium when` * * < 0. The Þrms' proÞt functions are the same as the ones given by (A15) and (A16). We derive the two reaction functions and we solve them to obtain a pair of prices. We then show that Þrm A has always an incentive to deviate to a price such that the resulting` * * is strictly positive. Contradiction. Hence, there does not exist such an equilibrium. ¥ Proof of proposition 4. From (21), and after we use (15) and (18), we obtain, h (` * ) 2 − (` * * ) If (A19) is positive, the social welfare when information sharing is banned increases. We set (A19) = 0 and we solve with respect to δ. This yields the following two non-zero solutions, First note that δ 1 < δ 2 . (A19) is negative for any δ < δ 1 and any δ > δ 2 . It is positive for δ ∈ (δ 1 , δ 2 ). It can be checked that if`A >
